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ABSTRACT
Predicting Plans and Actions in Two-Player Repeated Games
Najma Mathema
Department of Computer Science, BYU
Master of Science
Artificial intelligence (AI) agents will need to interact with both other AI agents and
humans. One way to enable effective interaction is to create models of associates to help to
predict the modeled agents’ actions, plans, and intentions. If AI agents are able to predict
what other agents in their environment will be doing in the future and can understand the
intentions of these other agents, the AI agents can use these predictions in their planning,
decision-making and assessing their own potential. Prior work [13, 14] introduced the S#
algorithm, which is designed as a robust algorithm for many two-player repeated games
(RGs) to enable cooperation among players. Because S# generates actions, has (internal)
experts that seek to accomplish an internal intent, and associates plans with each expert, it
is a useful algorithm for exploring intent, plan, and action in RGs.
This thesis presents a graphical Bayesian model for predicting actions, plans, and
intents of an S# agent. The same model is also used to predict human action. The actions,
plans and intentions associated with each S# expert are (a) identified from the literature
and (b) grouped by expert type. The Bayesian model then uses its transition probabilities
to predict the action and expert type from observing human or S# play. Two techniques
were explored for translating probability distributions into specific predictions: Maximum A
Posteriori (MAP) and Aggregation approach.
The Bayesian model was evaluated for three RGs (Prisoners Dilemma, Chicken and
Alternator) as follows. Prediction accuracy of the model was compared to predictions from
machine learning models (J48, Multi layer perceptron and Random Forest) as well as from the
fixed strategies presented in [20]. Prediction accuracy was obtained by comparing the model’s
predictions against the actual player’s actions. Accuracy for plan and intent prediction was
measured by comparing predictions to the actual plans and intents followed by the S# agent.
Since the plans and the intents of human players were not recorded in the dataset, this thesis
does not measure the accuracy of the Bayesian model against actual human plans and intents.
Results show that the Bayesian model effectively models the actions, plans, and intents of
the S# algorithm across the various games. Additionally, the Bayesian model outperforms
other methods for predicting human actions. When the games do not allow players to
communicate using so-called “cheap talk”, the MAP-based predictions are significantly better
than Aggregation-based predictions. There is no significant difference in the performance of
MAP-based and Aggregation-based predictions for modeling human behavior when cheaptalk
is allowed, except in the game of Chicken.
Keywords: Repeated games, Bayesian model, Bayes filter, conditional probabilities, S#
algorithm
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Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1

Overview

When agents interact, it is useful for one agent to have an idea of how other agents are going
to act, what their plans are, and what intentions guide both their plans and actions. It is
important that agents should be able to interact effectively over a long time span and should
also be explainable (be able to explain its own and others’ actions). This thesis presents a
Bayesian model that (a) predicts actions of other agents and (b) identifies their plans and
intent. The model uses observations from past interactions to predict the modeled agents’
actions, plans, and intentions.
This research is based on perspective from the literature in which intentions are the
reasons behind actions, and that plans are the means for mapping intentions to actions [9,
27, 32]. The overarching objective of the research is (a) to be able to infer another agents’
plans, goals, intentions and (b) to predict behavior (actions) based on models of the other
agents’ internal states as well as observations of their actions in an environment. If an AI
agent is able to predict future actions, the agent can plan ahead for appropriate actions and
hence be able to make better decisions for the future.
This work makes predictions in the context of Repeated Games (RGs). Game theory
has been applied in numerous ways to understand human/agent behavior, relationships, and
decision-making. RGs in game theory provide an environment for understanding and studying
the relationship between agents because the game construct requires each agent to account
for the consequence of its actions on the future actions of the other agent.

1

Prior work [13, 14] introduced the S# algorithm, which is designed as a robust
algorithm for many two-player RGs. This thesis creates a model for predicting actions, plans,
and intents assuming the agent to be modeled is an S# agent. S# is studied because it is
a highly effective algorithm in RGs and because it uses explicit models of planners (called
“experts”) that are motivated by specific designer intentions [14, 30].
A generative Bayesian model is used to predict S#’s behavior in RGs. The Bayesian
model assumes that agents have internal states defining the “state of mind” used to select
what action they would want to take given the observations they see. In the model, the
observations are (a) the verbal proposals the players share with each other prior to taking
their action and (b) the actions taken by both the S# agent and the agent with whom S# is
interacting.
The generative Bayesian model provides a probability distribution over the S# agent’s
internal states. This probability distribution can be used as input to algorithms that predict
the most likely state, the most likely action, the most likely plan, and the most likely intention.
Two types of algorithms for translating the distribution into predictions are be explored: (a) a
Maximum A Posteriori (MAP) estimate of the most likely state, which implicitly identifies an
action, plan, and intention; and (b) estimates of actions, plans, and intentions that aggregate
probability over related states.
This thesis is motivated by three broad problems: The first motivation is that using
ideas from so-called folk psychology, namely using the intentions that frame plans and actions
as a means for creating models of other agents might lead to explainable AI algorithms. The
second motivation is that by learning to model other agents, we can learn lessons about
modeling that allow an AI agent to be able to assess its own proficiency at a task. Each of
these first two motivations is discussed in the review of related literature in Chapter 2.
The third broad motivation is that modeling an S# agent builds groundwork for
modeling other types of agents. S# makes actions, hidden states, and plans explicit, while
allowing different implicit intentions encoded by the human designer through his or her choice

2

of expert. Thus, modeling S# agents can help us learn how to model other game-playing
agents like humans.

1.2

Thesis Layout

The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents the literature review in this field.
Chapter 3 is a published workshop paper that discusses the Bayesian model and the results
for Prisoners Dilemma game. Chapter 4 describes how the states and conditional probabilities
have been constructed for the Bayesian Model from the S# algorithm. Chapter 5 analyzes the
results and discussion for results for the two other repeated games: Chicken and Alternator.
Chapter 6 summarizes the thesis and also presents future work. Appendix 6.2 presents the
types of experts initialized in S# for all three games. Appendix B presents the details on the
dataset and the experiments run for the work.

3

Chapter 2
Related Literature

2.1

Repeated Games

Repeated Games (RGs) are simply single stage games being played repeatedly, either a fixed
number of rounds or a random number of rounds unknown before play. The proposed work
considers two player games, with players denoted by player i and player ¬i. A variant of RGs
implemented by Crandall et al. [14, 30], called RGs with “cheap talk”, allows each player to
share messages/proposals with the other player before actions are taken. Cheap talk gives
player i an opportunity to share its plans, sentiments, threats, bluffs, etc., in an effort to
influence the player ¬i in a way that facilitates the player i ’s goal. Players can be humans or
artificial agents, enabling human-human, human-agent, or agent-agent interaction.
S# is an algorithm developed by Crandall et al. [14, 30] for effectively cooperating
with agents to maximize payoffs while minimizing disappointment. S# is built on top of
S++ [13, 30], sharing the same internal states, but with the ability of cheap talk to share the
intentionality of the players. S++ has been tested extensively in agent-agent interactions,
and S# has been evaluated in human-agent interactions [13, 14, 30].

2.2

Intentional Action

Consider the motivation of using the notion of “intentionality” from folk psychology as the
basis for modeling other agents. As per [16], people regard Autonomous Intelligent Systems
as intentional agents; people therefore use the conceptual framework and psychological
mechanisms of human behavior explanation to understand and interact with them. Folk
4

Psychology suggests that it is the belief, desire and intention of humans that controls human
behavior, and that our intention is the precursor to the action we take [32]. Hence, inferring
the intent behind a particular action allows a human to infer the plans and goals of the
agent. In this context, intent is associated with the commitment to achieve a particular goal
through a plan [9]. “Commitment” is the key, as it allows prioritizing resources to be used in
pursuing the intent rather than other desires. Once an intent is formed and a plan is selected
to achieve the desire, an “intentional” action is one that is derived as an instrumental means
for moving towards the intent.
M. de Graaf et al. mention that so-called “autonomous intelligent systems” exhibit
traits like planning and decision making, and hence are considered “intentional agents” [16].
They further claim that the behaviors of intentional agents can be explained using the human
conceptual framework known as behavior explanation.
Related to the literature on intentional agents is work in so-called “folk psychology” [9,
27, 32], in which agent beliefs, desires, and intentions are used to explain how and why agents
choose actions towards reaching their goal. The main reason behind performing any action
is considered to be the intention behind that action, though there are different factors that
come before and in between mapping intentions to actions [1, 9, 19, 27].
Complementing and extending the folk psychology work on intentions, The Theory of
Reasoned Action and Planned Behavior provides another model for behavior explanation [1, 18,
19]. This model explains actions based on attitudes, intentions, subjective norms, perceived
behavioral control (PBC), and behavioral, normative and control beliefs.

2.3

Modeling Other Agents

Seminal work on modeling agents in the field of game theory was done by Robert Axelrod [3].
Axelrod’s models allow strategies to play against each other as agents to determine the
winning strategy in Prisoners Dilemma tournaments. Early work on agent modeling tended to
focus on equilibrium solutions for games and has now extended to various fields of computer
5

science including human-robot interaction [25], multiagent learning [40], and robot soccer
tournaments [23].
One modeling approach is to predict action probabilities for the modeled agent. One
early example of modeling action probabilities is the Fictitious Play algorithm where the
modeling agents learn probabilities by counting the number of times actions are played in
simulated interactions [11]. In contrast to the simple empirical probability distributions of
fictitious play, other authors have worked on making action predictions by learning the action
probabilities of the opponent conditioned on their own actions [6, 38].
Modeling based on the so-called agent type or behavior of the players, [22] mentions
each player having belief about the joint probability distribution indicating the selection of
the possible types of other players. In the implementation of S#, the types or the experts
have been specified manually [13], whereas there are other works in literature where agents
do not have such prior knowledge of experts, and is based on interaction history [7]. Albrecht
et al. [2] present research directed towards effective multiagent interaction without prior
coordination.
Similar to our research objective, i.e. to be able to predict the next moves of the
opponent, [21] worked on an algorithm called Turan to model the opponent player using
finite state machines. [17] studies Prisoners Dilemma as a game with incomplete information
and using Bayes rule and past interaction history to form a possibility distribution table
for each players’ choice to predict the players’ choices; this work found the Bayes Model to
be superior to other strategies. Another approach that used a Bayesian model for action
prediction, predicted users’ next actions in a command line shell using probabilistic model
conditioned on user’s previous commands [15].

2.4

Inferring Intent

There has not been much research in predicting or inferring intents of agents in Repeated
Play Games, but there has been previous works in predicting intent of agents in various other
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fields. Intent in prior work relates to goals and plans. [24] talks about the goals of agents in
mixed motive games by identifying their motivational orientation(cooperative, individualistic,
or competitive) based on their choice behavior in decomposed games. Thus, knowing the
motive of the subject, they use it to predict actions for Prisoners Dilemma. The work in [12]
linked intent with goal specificity and temporal range when predicting intents on using online
platforms. Their work uses different machine learning classifiers to predict user intent for
using Pinterest after observing user behavior.
Very recent research work uses deep-learning models for intent prediction. [35] used
traditional machine learning classifiers like Naive Bayes, SVM, Random Forest and others,
and compared the results to deep-learning models like Convolutional Neural Netwok(CNN)
and bi-directional for labeling the information-seeking conversations (MSDialog data) [8, 34].
Similarly, [33] used a recurrent neural network and a CNN model to predict user intent based
on the queries used to access a certain webpage, where the intent group was identified as
informational, transactional and navigational based on the taxonomy from [10].
Other methods that use Bayesian models for intent prediction include [29, 37, 41].
Using a multimodal perceptual system fused with an HMM that gives a prior probability
estimate of the user’s intention, the work in [29] focused on detecting user’s intention-forinteraction. Intention is detected by a thresholded output of the posterior estimate. Likewise
using an HMM, work in [41] encoded the underlying intent of actions in hidden states; the
algorithm was able to detect the intention before the goal was achieved. Work in [37] treated
the user intent as a goal, where the estimation of intent or the goal is done using a Bayesian
framework combining the user input and prior knowledge on environment to yield a posterior
probability distribution over its set of goals.

2.5

Intention, Proficiency, Efficacy

Consider the motivation for working toward proficiency self-assessment. Having the ability
to form intentions that relate to an agent’s goals and being able to follow through with the
7

Figure 2.1: Mapping beliefs to behavior
corresponding plans are what makes an agent proficient. Hence, by predicting the agents’
actions, plans and intentions, and comparing these to the outcomes that an agent’s actions
produce, we can form an assessment of proficiency by comparing intended actions to observed
outcomes.
Figure 2.1 illustrates a relationship between several ideas that are similar to the
notion of intent. The belief that agents have on self about their proficiency has been called
self-efficacy. Bandura defines self-efficacy as (a) an individual’s belief in its own ability to
achieve goals or perform tasks, and (b) how well the agent performs [5]. Ajzen mentions
“Perceived Behavioral Control”(PBC) as one of the factors affecting intentions in his work on
the Theory of Planned Behavior. Both PBC and self-efficacy refer to beliefs about having
skills to achieve one’s goal [1]. In fact, Ajzen mentions that the concept of PBC was actually
influenced from Bandura’s concept of self-efficacy and that is why PBC can be considered
identical to self-efficacy and hence can be considered as one of the predictors of behavioral
intention.
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Chapter 3
Predicting Plans and Actions in Two-Player Repeated Games

This chapter was published as a workshop paper in The AAAI 2020 Workshop on
Plan, Activity, and Intent Recognition [28].
Abstract
Artificial intelligence (AI) agents will need to interact with both other AI agents and
humans. Creating models of associates help to predict the modeled agents’ actions, plans,
and intentions. This work introduces algorithms that predict actions, plans and intentions
in repeated play games, with providing an exploration of algorithms. We form a generative
Bayesian approach to model S#. S# is designed as a robust algorithm that learns to cooperate
with its associate in 2 by 2 matrix games. The actions, plans and intentions associated
with each S# expert are identified from the literature, grouping the S# experts accordingly,
and thus predicting actions, plans, and intentions based on their state probabilities. Two
prediction methods are explored for Prisoners Dilemma: the Maximum A Posteriori (MAP)
and an Aggregation approach. MAP (≈ 89% accuracy) performed the best for action
prediction. Both methods predicted plans of S# with ≈ 88% accuracy. Paired T-test shows
that MAP performs significantly better than Aggregation for predicting S#’s actions without
cheap talk. Intention is explored based on the goals of the S# experts; results show that goals
are predicted precisely when modeling S#. The obtained results show that the proposed
Bayesian approach is well suited for modeling agents in two-player repeated games.
When agents interact, it is useful for one agent to have an idea of what other agents are going
to do, what their plans are, and what intentions guide both their plans and actions. This
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work creates agent models that allow utilizing the observations from their past interactions
to predict the modeled agent’s actions, plans, and intentions to develop algorithms that:
(a) predict actions of another agent and (b) identify their plans and intent.
The main concept of the work is based on the perspective from the literature in
which intentions are the reasons behind actions, and that plans are the means for mapping
intentions to actions [9, 27, 32]. The overarching objective of the research is to infer another
agent’s plans, goals, intentions and predict behavior (actions) based on these inferences and
using observations of their actions in an environment. If an AI agent is able to predict future
actions, the agent can plan ahead for appropriate actions and hence be able to make better
decisions for the future.
This work makes predictions in the context of Repeated Games (RGs). Game theory
has been applied in numerous ways to understand human/agent behavior, relationships, and
decision-making. RGs in game theory provide an environment for understanding and studying
the relationship between agents because the game construct requires each agent to account
for the consequence of its action on the future action of the other agent. The dilemma of
whether to cooperate or to compete with each other has been extensively studied in the
game Prisoners Dilemma in the literature of psychology, economics, politics and many other
disciplines. Hence, the same game has been used for this study. Prior work [13, 14] introduced
the S# algorithm, which is designed as a robust algorithm that learns to cooperate with its
associate in many 2 by 2 matrix games. S# is built on top of S++ [13] with the ability to share
costless, non-binding signals called “cheap talk” indicating its experts’ intentionality. For
better expert-selection, in each round prior to taking an action, the players get an opportunity
to communicate by sharing their plans via cheap talk. This paper presents a model for
predicting actions, plans, and intents assuming the agent to be modeled is an S# agent. S#
is studied because it is a highly effective algorithm in RGs and it uses explicit models of
planners (called “experts”) that are motivated by specific designer intentions [14, 30]. In
the context of modeling S#’s behavior in RGs, we use a generative Bayesian model, which
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assumes that agents have a number of internal states defining the “state of mind” used to
select what action they would want to take given the observations they see. The observations
are (a) the speech acts/proposals via cheap talk that the players share with each other prior
to taking their action and (b) the actions taken by both the S# agent and the agent with
whom S# is interacting. Table 3.1 shows a few interactions of S# against a human player
ABL in Prisoners Dilemma.
Round
35
35
36
36
37

Player
S#
ABL
S#
ABL
S#

37
38
38

ABL
S#
ABL

Speech acts
None
You betrayed me. Curse you.
None
None
In your face! I forgive you. Let’s alternate between AC and BC. This round,
let’s play BC. Do as I say or I will
punish you.
Let’s always play BD.
Excellent. This round, let’s play AC.
None

Action
B
D
B
C
B

Payoff
20
20
100
0
100

C
A
C

0
60
60

Table 3.1: S# vs human player ABL in the Prisoner’s Dilemma
The generative Bayesian model provides a probability distribution over the S# agent’s
internal states. This probability distribution can be used as input to algorithms that predict
the most likely state, the most likely action, the most likely plan, and the most likely intention.
Additionally, this kind of Bayesian model is not dependent on the type of RGs, and thus
could be used for many two-player RGs. Since the model is based on observations in the
environment and employs Bayesian reasoning, it does not require a huge dataset to train the
model for better performance. Two types of algorithms for translating the distribution into
predictions will be explored: (a) a Maximum A Posteriori (MAP) estimate of the most likely
state, which implicitly identifies an action, plan, and intention; and (b) estimates of actions,
plans, and intentions that aggregate probability over related states.
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3.1

Related Literature

A variant of RGs implemented by Crandall et al. [14, 30], called RGs with “cheap talk”,
allows each player to share messages/proposals with the other player before actions are taken.

3.1.1

Intentional Action

Consider the motivation of using the notion of “intentionality” from folk psychology as the
basis for modeling other agents. As per [16], people regard “Autonomous Intelligent Systems”
as intentional agents; people, therefore, use the conceptual and psychological means of human
behavior explanation to understand and interact with them. Folk Psychology suggests that
it is the belief, desire, and intention of humans that control human behavior and that our
intention is the precursor to the action we take [32]. Hence, inferring the intent behind a
particular action allows a human to infer the plans and goals of the agent. In this context,
intent is associated with the commitment to achieve a particular goal through a plan [9].
Once an intent is formed and a plan is selected to achieve the desire, an “intentional” action
is one that is derived as an instrumental means for moving towards the intent.
M. de Graaf et al. mention that so-called “Autonomous Intelligent Systems” exhibit
traits like planning and decision making, and hence are considered “intentional agents” [16].
They further claim that the behaviors of intentional agents can be explained using the human
conceptual framework known as behavior explanation.
Related to the literature on intentional agents is work in “folk psychology” [9, 27, 32],
in which agent beliefs, desires, and intentions are used to explain how and why agents choose
actions towards reaching their goal. Baker et al. (2011) presented a Bayesian model of human
Theory of Mind based on inverse planning to make joint inferences about the agents’ desires
and beliefs about unobserved aspects of the environment. Similar to our work, they model
the world as a kind of Markov Decision Process and use the observations in the environment
to generate posterior probabilities about the environment. Additionally, by inverting the
model, they make inferences about the agents’ beliefs and desires.
12

3.1.2

Modeling Other Agents

Seminal work on modeling agents in the field of game theory was presented in [3]. Axelrod’s
models allow strategies to play against each other as agents to determine the winning strategy
in Prisoners Dilemma tournaments. Early work on agent modeling tended to focus on
equilibrium solutions for games and has now extended to various fields of computer science
like [23, 25, 40].
One modeling approach is to predict action probabilities for the modeled agent, an
early example which is the Fictitious Play algorithm [11]. In contrast to the simple empirical
probability distributions of fictitious play, other authors have worked on making action
predictions by learning the action probabilities of the opponent conditioned on their own
actions [6, 38].
Similar to our research objective, which is to be able to predict the next moves of the
opponent, Gaudesi et al. [21] worked on an algorithm called Turan to model the opponent
player using finite state machines. The work in [17] studies Prisoners Dilemma as a game
with incomplete information and using Bayes rule and past interaction history to form a
possibility distribution table for each players’ choice to predict the players’ choices. Park
et al. (2016) assert that building precise models of players in Iterated Prisoners Dilemma
requires a good dataset, so they use a Bootstrap aggregation approach to generate new data
randomly from the original dataset. Also, an observer uses active learning approach to model
the behavior of its opponent.

3.1.3

Inferring Intent

There has not been much research in predicting or inferring intents of agents in RGs, but
there has been previous work in predicting the intent of agents in various other fields. Intent
in prior work relates to goals and plans. Kuhlman et al. (1975) talk about the goals of
agents in mixed-motive games by identifying their motivational orientation (cooperative,
individualistic, or competitive) based on their choice behavior in decomposed games. Thus,
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Figure 3.1: Modeling S#
knowing the motive of the subject, they use it to predict actions for Prisoners Dilemma. The
work in [12] linked intent with goal specificity and temporal range when predicting intents in
online platforms. Very recent research work uses deep-learning models for intent prediction
[33, 35]. Rabkina et al. (2013) used a computational model based on analogical reasoning to
enable intent recognition and action prediction. Other methods that use Bayesian models for
intent prediction include [29, 37, 41].

3.2
3.2.1

Modeling Framework
Bayesian Graphical Model

A Bayesian graphical model is used to model S#. The model begins with a prior probability
distribution over possible S# agent states and then propagates that distribution using
observations of actions and speech-acts/proposals.
The structure of the Bayesian model is illustrated in Figure 3.1. The model makes it
evident that future predictions are based on the present state and immediate observations.
Understanding this model is made easier by comparing it to a Hidden Markov Model (HMM).
An HMM is a five-tuple




HMM = S, O, p(s0 ), p(st+1 |st ), p(ot |st ) ,
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where S is a finite set of (hidden) states, O is a finite set of observations, p(s0 ) is the initial
state distribution (i.e., the distribution over states at time t = 0), p(st+1 |st ) represents the
transition probability function that describes how states change over time, and p(ot |st ) is the
emission probabilities (i.e., the probability that a given observation ot is generated by hidden
state st ). An HMM is one of the most simple dynamic Bayesian models because it describes
how states change over time. A common application of HMMs is to try to infer a most likely
hidden state from a series of observations.
Like an HMM, our model is also a dynamic model, but the inference task is slightly
different and so are the model elements. The proposed model differs from the traditional
HMM in two ways: First, the Bayesian model makes two state transitions at a single time
step, that is, there are two hidden states at each time step. Second, there is an external
input to the model. Figure 3.1 illustrates the proposed model. In the figure, the player being
modeled is denoted by a subscript ‘-i’ whereas the player’s associate (in the game) is denoted
by a subscript ‘i’.
The Bayesian model is a tuple with seven elements,

BM odel =



S, O, Σ, p(ŝ−i (t)|s−i (t), z−i (t), zi (t)),

p(s−i (t + 1)|ŝ−i (t), ai (t), a−i (t)),


p(z−i (t)|s−i (t)), p(a−i (t)|ŝ−i (t)) .

As with the HMM, S represents the set of states and O represents the set of observations. The
set of states has two different kinds of states, s−i ∈ S, which represent propositional states
(states from which speech acts are generated) and ŝ−i ∈ S, which represent action states
(states from which game actions are chosen). The set of observations O has two different
kinds of observations: (1) the speech acts/proposals, {z−i } ∈ O, shared by the player being
modeled and (2) the action, {a−i } ∈ O, taken by the player being modeled. Σ is the set of
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exogenous inputs to the model, which consists of the observed actions and speech acts of the
other player in the game, represented by ai and zi , respectively.
As mentioned earlier, the model of agent −i is based on a time series with two types
of hidden states, s−i (t) and ŝ−i (t). The proposed model takes two state transitions at a single
time step. For a single time step, the first state transition occurs from s−i (t) to ŝ−i (t) based
on the observation of what proposals are shared. ŝ−i (t) is a kind of temporary state for S#,
from which it generates its aspiration level to choose the expert to play the game further.
The next state transition from ŝ−i (t) to s−i (t + 1) takes place based on the observation of
the actions of the players. This state transition gives the prediction for the state at the next
time step, which is then utilized in predicting the action of the modeled player for the next
time step.
S(t) is the set of states available to the modeling agent i at time t, and is given by
the union of all the states in each expert’s state machine,

S(t) = ∪j∈J Sφj .

3.2.2

Conditional Probabilities

The Bayesian model makes use of the priors and conditional probabilities to find the posterior
probability of the states after each observation. The priors about the states of the experts
represent the agent’s beliefs about the states. Ideally, prior probabilities should be fairly close
to the true probabilities in real scenarios; prior probabilities affect the future computations
and the predictions to be made. For computing the priors, the initial knowledge about S#
and how the experts are formed and then selected is utilized.
Based on the game, S# generates a set of experts, which are essentially strategies
that employ learning algorithm to select actions and generate and respond to speech acts,
based on the state it is in. To select an expert to take an action, the “expert potential” needs
to meet a specified aspiration level and the expert also needs to carry out plans which are
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congruent with its partner’s last proposed plan. Thus, the priors for models of S# agents are
the probabilities that S# selects a particular expert in the first round based on the expert’s
potential and uniform distribution over the aspiration level, with most of the probability
assigned to the start state of the expert.
The following conditional probability elements describe the necessary components for
designing the model. The notation used in the conditional probabilities is given by:

a : action, z : proposal, i : P artner, −i : S#.

1. Sensor Model 1 (Speech): Given the current state of the agent, the sensor model
provides the probability of seeing a particular proposal.

p(z−i (t) | s−i (t))

2. Transition Model 1 (Reflection): For the same time step, the transition model is used
for transitioning to a new state after the proposals are observed.

p(ŝ−i (t) | s−i (t), zi (t), z−i (t))

3. Sensor Model 2 (Action): Given the state of the agent, the sensor model provides the
probability of seeing a particular action.

p(a−i (t) | ŝ−i (t))

4. Transition Model 2 (Update): Once the actions are taken by both the players, the
update model encodes how a state transition occurs to a new state for the next time
step.
p(s−i (t + 1) | ŝ−i (t), ai (t), a−i (t))
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The S# algorithm has Finite State Machines (FSMs) for each of the experts which
define what speech acts are to be generated based on the internal states of the experts and
the events in the game [14]. The events in the game could involve the event of selecting
an expert or the events that affect individual experts. These FSMs have state transition
functions that map the events, internal states, and speech outputs. Hence, for the game, the
above conditional probabilities have been determined based on how S# acts in each event
and also adding some uncertainty to make sure that other possible transitions are non-zero.

3.2.3

Updating the Probability Distribution – Bayes Filter Algorithm

An algorithm is needed to aggregate observations into a distribution over the hidden states.
Since the proposed model is a dynamic Bayesian model, a Bayes Filter is an appropriate
algorithm [42]. The Bayes Filter is a general algorithm for estimating an unknown probability
density function over time given the observations. The beliefs are computed recursively and
are updated at each time step with the most recent observations. The algorithm presented in
Algorithm 1 is the Bayes Filter Algorithm modified from the model in [42] to reflect the two
hidden states.
Algorithm 1: Bayes Filter Algorithm
1 function Bayes Filter ();
2 bel(s0 ) ;
3 bel(s0 ) = ηP (z−i (0) | bel(s0 ));
4 for t to len(observations) do
5
for st ∈ states do
P
6
bel(sˆt ) = st P (sˆt | zi (t), z−i (t), st )bel(st );
7
bel(sˆt ) = ηP (a−i (t) | st )bel(sˆt );
8
end
9
for st ∈ states do
P
10
bel(st+1 ) = ŝt P (st+1 | ai (t), a−i (t), sˆt )bel(sˆt );
11
bel(st+1 ) = ηP (z−i (t) | st+1 )bel(st+1 );
12
end
13 end
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3.2.4

Predicting Actions, Plans, and Intents

The Bayesian model and the Bayes Filter algorithm yield a probability distribution over
hidden states in the model. From this distribution, one of the main tasks in this paper is to
predict actions, plans, and intents. For each prediction, we will explore two methods: a MAP
estimate and a more complete aggregation method. This subsection addresses how actions,
plans, and intent can be predicted.

Predicting an Action
The results presented in this paper have been obtained for the Prisoners Dilemma game, so
the set of possible actions contains Cooperate, Defect.

MAP Estimate for Action Prediction The MAP estimate takes the maximum of all
the probabilities over the actions available to predict an action, âMAP . The action probabilities
are calculated by aggregating over all states as:

âMAP = arg max

X

a

P (s)P (a|s)

sS

Aggregation Method for Action Prediction Each expert φj has different states s ∈ Sφj
with the probability distribution over each of these states P (sφj ) generated by the Bayesian
model. Summing probabilities for all the states that belong to a given expert is done for each
expert giving p(φj ) =

P

s∈Sφj

P (s). The expert with the maximum probability is identified,

and the action is selected with the equation below:

âφ = arg max
a

X
sSφj
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P (s)P (a|s)

Predicting a Plan
We can categorize each expert as having a follower type or a leader type, as per the categorization of plan in [26]. A “leader type” creates strategies that will influence its partner to
play a particular action by playing a trigger strategy that induces its partner to comply or be
punished. Trigger strategies are the ones where a player begins by cooperation but defects for
a predefined period of time when the other player shows a certain level of defection (opponent
triggers through defection). The experts have a punishment stage in their state diagrams.
The punishment phase is the strategy designed to minimize the partner’s maximum expected
payoff. The punishment phase persists from the time the partner deviates from the offer until
the sum of its partner’s payoffs (from the time of the deviation) is below what it would have
obtained had it not deviated from the offer [14]. Hence the partner’s optimal strategy would
be to follow the offer.
A “follower type” expects its partner to do something and it plays the best response
to their move. A follower assumes that its partner is using a trigger strategy. That means
it assumes that its partner will propose an offer which is expected to be followed or else it
might be punished. Following an offer may require the player to play fair (both getting the
same payoff), to bully (demanding higher payoff than its associate) or to be bullied (accept
lower payoffs than its associate).
Two approaches can be used to estimate the leader/follower plan being used: MAP
and Aggregation.
MAP Estimate for Plan Prediction Let θ(φi ) ∈ { leader, follower} indicate the “type”
of expert φi . The plan is then the most probable type. For this we first identify the MAP
estimate for which expert is most likely and then select that expert’s type,


θ̂ = θ arg max
φi
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X
s∈Sφi



P (s) .

Aggregation Method for Plan Prediction Similar to how the probabilities of actions
could be aggregated across states, we can aggregate probabilities across plan types and then
choose the most likely type as follows:

θ̂ = arg

X

X

max
P (s).
type∈{lead, foll} θ(φi )==type s∈Sφ
i

Predicting Intent
Each expert can be categorized by the goal it seeks to achieve by adopting its strategy. This
is similar to categorizing agents by plan type, but the categorization is by intent type. We
identify the intent using the Bayesian model of S# using the simple rule: the intent of S#
is the intent of the expert it uses to achieve its goal. S# experts fall into two goal types:
“Maximizing Payoff” and “Maximizing Fairness” (by minimizing the difference between the
two player’s payoffs).
Intent can be predicted by identifying the intent type of the most likely expert using
the MAP estimate, or by aggregating probabilities over intent types and then selecting the
most probable type. These two prediction methods are exactly analogous to predicting plan
type from the previous subsection so details are omitted.

3.3
3.3.1

Experiments, Results and Discussion
Data preparation

The dataset used in this work is from previous work by Crandall et al. (2018) on RGs with
cheap talk. Interaction logs have been recorded for human-human interaction and human
interaction with S#. Two players play Prisoners Dilemma against each other, each game
lasting 51 rounds. For each round, each player gets an opportunity to share messages before
taking their actions (which could include their plan to play a particular action, or anything
they would want to say to their opponent). Interaction logs are formed based on those game
logs, consisting of payoffs, cheap talk and actions played by the players in each gameplay.
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There are a total of 24 interactions, 12 human-human games and 12 human-S# games, lasting
51 rounds each.
Another dataset is formed by having the strategies shown in Table B.2 play against
both the S# and human players. This dataset is used to compare the predictions of the
proposed graphical Bayesian Model to evaluate its performance.

3.3.2

Predicting Intent and Plans

Two approaches were used for predicting the intent and the plan of the players for the
repeated Prisoners Dilemma game: the MAP and aggregation method. In our experiments,
both the methods for predicting intent predicted “Maximize payoff” as the intent of the
players for all interactions. For predictions for S#, the models’ predictions comply with the
actual intent of the experts of S#. This is because the experts of S# were designed in [14]
with the intent to Maximize Payoff, except the Bouncer strategy which is never initialized for
the Prisoners Dilemma game (Bouncer is relevant for other repeated games).
For validating the plan prediction, the interaction history was run through S# to see
which of the experts were selected during each interaction, and hence the corresponding plan
followed by the expert was considered as the true plan followed.
When used for humans, the model also predicts the intent to be “Maximizing Payoff”.
Unfortunately, we do not have measures to evaluate the intent prediction for humans for this
game, which could be considered one of the limitations in our work. The intent prediction
is based on the intent of the experts of S#. It would have been interesting to evaluate the
intent of the players from a different perspective like with respect to their personalities or
motivational orientation as in the work [24], where the goal of cooperative, competitive, and
individualistic agents is to achieve joint gain, relative gain, and own gain respectively.
Both MAP and Aggregation approaches achieved an accuracy of ≈88% for predicting
plans for S#. Paired T-test shows that the difference in average performance between the
MAP approach and Aggregation for plan prediction is not big enough to be statistically
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Figure 3.2: Average action prediction accuracy.
significant (p = 0.0997). But for predictions without cheap talk, paired T-test show that the
difference in average performance between the MAP approach and Aggregation is statistically
significant (p = 0.0328), MAP being better.

3.3.3

Predicting actions

Average accuracy for action predictions The average accuracy for predicting actions
using the MAP and Aggregation was calculated for modeling S#. Considering humans have
similar internal states, the ability to form intentions, and plans to take actions, the same
model was then used to model humans. MAP performed better than Aggregation and was
able to predict the actions 89.05% of the time for S#, and 88.45% of the time for humans. We
also tried experimenting on predicting the actions without using cheap talk and achieved an
accuracy of 85.62% for S# and 88.02% for humans. Figure 3.2 summarizes the results. Paired
T-test shows that the difference in average performance between the MAP and Aggregation
approaches is not big enough to be statistically significant (p = 0.338). However, without
cheap talk, the paired T-test shows that MAP performs significantly better than Aggregation
for predicting actions(p = 0.0328).
There were 7 predictions where the accuracy was less than 80%. Looking at the data,
we found that this was because of players who lie (≈51% of the time on average). Lying refers
to proposing a particular action but taking a different one during his/her turn. If we omit
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Figure 3.3: Action prediction comparison for players who lie.

Figure 3.4: Comparison of action predictions for modeling Player 1 and 2 (Our model vs
Others).
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such interactions, MAP was 93.31% accurate for modeling humans who lie less frequently
(18.6% of the time on average), and when we ignored the cheap talk, it was 92.2% accurate.
We see that the predictions were always better with cheap talk(without lying) as it
provided more information about the interaction. It was interesting to see that the only time
the accuracy bumped up when not using cheap talk, was when we modeled humans who lie.
In this case, the accuracy of our model increased from 68.35% to 70.59% without cheap talk
(for MAP approach). Thus, with this observation, we realize that our model performs well
for modeling both S# and humans except for the agents who lie. The results are presented
in Figure 3.3.

3.3.4

Comparing MAP predictions to fixed models

The action predictions from our model were compared with predictions from the fixed models
presented in [20]. The performance of the MAP and aggregation were comparable. The
Bayesian model outperformed the fixed strategies. However, it was interesting to see that Tit
for tat performed nearly as well as our model for the action predictions. Also, the Exploitive
Tit for Tat also performed very close to that of Tit for Tat.
Figure 3.4 shows how our model performed in modeling players 1 and 2 vs other
strategies. The player number simply indicates the player who goes first in each game. The
following subsection presents how our model performs better in modeling dynamic behavior
in agents as compared to the fixed strategy models.

3.3.5

Comparing MAP predictions excluding consistent interactions

Each of the interactions between all the players were observed carefully. Out of 48, 24 of the
players had taken the same action repeatedly for more than 75% of the rounds. For fixed
strategies like Tit for tat, it is easier to make correct predictions in such cases, as interactions
were consistent for at least 75% of the rounds. So, another analysis was performed where
we considered only those interactions which had more variance in its actions in each of the
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Figure 3.5: Performance with <=25% continuous repetition in actions.
rounds. More specifically, interactions with only 25% or fewer continuous repetition of the
same action were taken. The results are presented in Figure 3.5. Previously, we observed
that Tit for tat and exploitative Tit for tat performed very close to our models. But as we
compare the interactions with more variance in actions across the rounds, our models were
able to perform significantly better as given by paired T-test (p = 0.0160). In addition, as we
disregarded the interactions including lies, the performance of MAP was increased to ≈82%,
and that of Aggregation increased to ≈81%.

3.4

Conclusion

This paper presented a graphical generative Bayesian model that models the S# algorithm
for two-player repeated games. The highlight of the model is its ability to model the internal
states of S#, considering each observation to calculate the posterior state probabilities, which
could also be used to model humans. The other benefit of using this kind of model is that it
is game independent, so it could be used for any two-player repeated game.
In comparison with other strategy models, the MAP approach on the Bayesian model
performed the best in predicting actions for the Prisoners Dilemma game. It could better
model the dynamic actions of players as compared to the other fixed strategy models. Also,
for both plan and action prediction, MAP performed significantly better without cheap talk,
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i.e. when it is an ordinary repeated game. Additionally, obtaining a high accuracy for plans
and intent prediction using the different approaches based on the same model, we can say
that this Graphical Bayesian Model shows promise for modeling agents in two-player repeated
games.
However, the model had some limitations. It was not able to detect its partners lying
in the game and hence did not perform very well in such situations. A future enhancement
could include creating experts for S# having the ability to deal with lies in the game. Also,
further exploration of the intent of players, based on other dimensions is necessary. It would
have been interesting to study intent from a different perspective such as based on the
personality of the players, and how the intention of players change over time.
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Chapter 4
Constructing the Bayesian Model from S# Agents

This chapter describes how the Bayesian model used in the previous and subsequent
chapters is constructed from the S# algorithm. The chapter is organized in two sections: the
first section describes how the states of the Bayesian model are derived from the states in the
S# algorithm, and the second section describes how transition probabilities are derived from
the S# algorithm.

4.1

States and Observations in the Bayesian Model

Figure 3.1 from Chapter 3, repeated in modified form as Figure 4.1, illustrates the Bayesian
model used in this thesis. The figure is modified from the previous figure by using subscripts i
to indicate the agent and subscripts −i to indicate the agent’s interaction partner. The
Bayesian model has internal states denoted by si and ŝi , and uses observations denoted by
zi , ai , z−i , and a−i .

Figure 4.1: Bayesian Model for S#.
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When the S# algorithm is initialized, it creates a set of possible experts for the game.
Each expert has its own internal finite state machine (FSM). The possible states for the
Bayesian Model are the internal states of the experts of the S# algorithm. The Bayesian
model creates a distribution over each possible value of si where the states take on values
from the set of possible FSM states in the S# algorithm.
The observations in the Bayesian model are the outputs from and the inputs to the
FSMs used by the S# algorithm. Recall that the outputs from each FSM are the actions, a,
and the speech acts, called “proposals” and denoted by z, chosen by the expert. The inputs
to the FSM are the speech acts, z−i , and actions, a−i , of the interaction partner, as well as
the payoffs received from the game. The observations in the Bayesian model are thus speech
acts and actions of both the S# agent, zi and ai , and the interaction partner, z−i and a−i .

4.2

FSMs for Modeling S#s Experts

The motivation for creating the states used in the experts’ FSMs comes from the idea of
expert strategies accepting or rejecting the offers made by their partners. There are two types
of strategies used in S#: leaders and followers. This section discusses each type. Appendix A
categorizes the named experts in the S# code into leader and follower types.

4.2.1

Leader Expert Type

In the Folk Theorem, a trigger strategy is a Nash equilibrium where both players play their
part of a nominal action profile unless their partner deviates from the action profile; if
the partner deviates from the action profile, the player punishes the partner indefinitely by
switching to minimax strategy [39]. An essential characteristic of the trigger strategy is to
never forgive by playing the minimax strategy till the end of the game.
For a single play of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Cooperate-Cooperate action profile is
not a Nash equilibrium. However, if the Prisoner’s Dilemma is played long enough then it is
possible to create a trigger strategy that includes the Cooperate-Cooperate as the nominal
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action profile, but a player will punish its partner by defecting if the partner ever defects
first. In the folk theory version of the trigger strategy, punishment never ends. This thesis,
however, uses a modified definition of a trigger strategy, one which includes punishment but
also includes forgiveness if certain conditions are met. Thus, the trigger strategies for the
Prisoner’s Dilemma in this thesis include punishment via defection, but also allow a partner
to be forgiven, triggering the player to try cooperating again.

Figure 4.2: Finite state machine for a general form of a trigger-based leader strategy
Each of S#’s leader experts is a modified trigger strategy. Figure 4.2 illustrates the
general trigger strategy pattern used by each of S#’s leader experts. The figure shows a state
machine with two states: an offer state and a guilt state. In the offer state, the agent proposes
a “target solution”, which is a pair of actions: one for the agent and one for its interaction
partner. In the figure, the offer state is proposing a target solution of Cooperate-Cooperate
(CC) to its partner. Given that S# agents do not lie, they always follow their part of the
target solution. If the interaction partner plays its part of the solution, the FSM stays in an
offer state. In the figure, if both players play “CC” then the expert stays in the same state.
The idea of staying in the same state is that, since both the players are satisfied with the
offer, the expert should propose the same target solution CC in the next round too, thus
transitioning to the same offer state.
By contrast, if an agent’s interaction partner deviates from the agent’s proposed target
solution, the agent transitions to the guilt state. In the figure, this is indicated by the “CD”
label on the edge, which means that the agent played C but the interaction partner played
D. The guilt state represents when an interaction partner deviated from what the agent
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proposed and is therefore deemed “guilty”. In the guilt state, the S# expert seeks to punish
its partner for deviating from the proposed solution. If S# is able to punish its partner
enough, it transitions back to the offer state; otherwise, the agent stays in the same guilt
state.
S# leader agents follow the pattern in Figure 4.2, but they implement the pattern in
different ways and through more states. Table 4.1 shows different events that are possible
during play with a trigger-based leader algorithm. The table is used in the following
paragraphs to explain how the state machines work for two different S# leader experts in the
Prisoners Dilemma. The two experts are called Leader-pure and Leader-alternating.
Symbol
s
f
d
g
p
u

Event descriptions
The current expert is satisfied with last round’s payoff.
The current expert forgives the other player.
The partner deviated from S#’s proposed solution but did not profit from it.
The partner profited by deviating from S#’s proposed solution (and is guilty).
The expert has punished its guilty partner.
S# did not succeed in punishing its guilty partner.

Table 4.1: A list of event symbols and event descriptions. The events correspond to the
events relevant to individual leader experts.

Figure 4.3: Finite state machine for the expert Leader-pure
Leader-pure Figure 4.3 presents the state machine for the Leader-pure expert. The state
“Start” in the Figure 4.3 represents the start state for the expert, and the notation is consistent
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for all the experts described in the following sections and paragraphs. This “Start” state
takes a Null input event with an output of a speech act to communicate with the partner
at the beginning of the game, and transitions to the initial state “i”. The speech act is to
propose a target solution of cooperate-cooperate.
The state “p” (p for “punish”) is the guilt state triggered by the event “g” in Table 4.1.
The guilt event occurs when (a) the partner does not follow the offer made by the current
expert and (b) the partner benefits from the defection. S# continues to remain in state “p”
if it does not succeed in punishing its guilty partner, indicating the unsuccessful event “u” in
Table 4.1. The unsuccessful event occurs when either the partner continues to defect or the
partner continues to benefit from its previous defection. Also, in case of the event “p” in the
Table 4.1, S# continues to stay in the guilt state “p”.
The “si” state represents a temporary transitional state to reach to state “s2” (satisfied
state) when the other player has been punished enough by S#. The transition from “p” to
“s2” through “si” is how Leader-pure forgives (the “f” in Table 4.1). The state “si” is an
additional state that takes null input and outputs a speech act depending on the situation.
It simply adds a variety to the speech acts to be shared with its partner.
All the other states with state names, s1 through s5, represent the “offer” or “satisfied”
state in the state machine. The single offer state has been extended to multiple offer states
as “s1”, “s2”, “s3”, “s4”, “s5” in Figure 4.3 as S# seeks to deliver different speech acts for
different events and states it is in. As the partner of S# accepts the offer made by S#, its
state transitions to the offer state “s1”, and further transitions to states “s2”, “s3”, “s4”,
and “s5” as the partner further accepts the offers made by S#. Transitions through these
states show ongoing cooperation between S# and its partner.
If there occurs defection at any state and the partner is guilty, Leader-pure transitions
to the punishment state “p”. The partner is considered guilty when he/she defects and also
benefits from the defection by earning a payoff higher than what it would have received if
he/she had followed the target solution. This is indicated by the event “g” in Table 4.1. The
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partner is not considered guilty if he/she defects but does not benefit from the defection.
This is indicated by the event “d” in Table: 4.1. In this case, there is also the possibility of
transitioning from states “i”, “s1”,“s2”,“s3”‘,“s4”,“s5” back to state “s1”.

Figure 4.4: Finite state machine for the expert Leader-alternating
Leader-alternating Figure 4.4 presents the state machine for the Leader-alternating expert
in the S# algorithm. The leader-alternating expert can propose any of the three target
patterns: CD-DC, CD-CC or CC-DC. For example, for the CD-DC pattern the leaderalternating expert suggests playing the solution pair CD and DC alternatively in each round.
Thus, the leader-alternating expert seeks to allow both the agent and its partner to benefit
from a defection, but wants to take turns with who benefits. The state “Start” in the Figure:
4.4 represents the start state for the expert. The start state takes the Null input, outputs a
speech act, and transitions to the initial state “i”.
The state “p” is the punishment state that occurs if Leader-alternating’s associate
is guilty (”g” from Table 4.1). The punishment state is reached when the partner (a) does
not follow the offer made by the expert and (b) benefits from the defection. S# continues to
remain in state “p” if it is unsuccessful in punishing its guilty partner, represented by event
“u” in Table 4.1. The state “si” represents a temporary transitional state to reach to state “s5”
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(satisfied state) when the other player has been punished enough by S#. The transition from
“p” to “si” to “s5” correspond to the event “f” in Table 4.1. The state “si” is an additional
state that takes null input and outputs a speech act depending on the situation. It simply
adds a variety to the speech acts to be shared with its partner.
All the other states with states, s1 through s11, represent “offer” or “satisfied” states
in the state machine. The single offer state has been extended to multiple offer states as
“s1”,“s2”,.... “s11” in Figure 4.4 as S# seeks to deliver different speech acts for different events
and states it is in. As the partner of S# accepts the offers made by S#, its state transitions
to the respective offer states. “i” is the initial state for the first part of the target solution,
and thus “i” transitions to “s3” when the first part of target solution is played. Similarly,
“s3” transitions to “s4” when the second part of the target solution is played. Since it is
an alternating strategy, playing the first part of the solution again makes the transition of
“s4” to “s7”, and continues likewise. Near to the end of the state machine diagram, “s10”
transitions to “s11” and “s11” to “s10” showing continued cooperation. Likewise, being in
state “s1” and playing the second part of the target solution also shows cooperation causing
the state to advance to “s2”. Similarly, following the target solution, “s2” transitions to “s5”,
“s5” to “s6” till “s10”. These transitions indicate a “satisfied” event, represented by the “s”
in Table 4.1.
If there occurs defection while playing the target solution and the partner benefits
from the defection, it transitions to punishment state “p”. This is indicated by the event “g”
from Table: 4.1. For the event “d” in Table: 4.1, there is also the possibility of transitioning
from the initial state “i” and other satisfied states “s” back to state “s2” or “s3”, indicating
an attempt to “reset” cooperation.

4.2.2

Follower Expert Type

Since a Follower expert simply follows the solution proposed by its partner, the state machine
for a follower expert type consists of the satisfied states only and not the guilt state. The
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possible events for a Follower type expert are presented in Table 4.2. State machines for
two instances of the follower experts, Follower-pure and Follower-alternating, for Prisoners
Dilemma are presented in the paragraphs below.
Symbol
s
d

Event descriptions
The current expert is satisfied with last round’s payoff.
The partner deviated from what S# proposed.

Table 4.2: A list of event symbols and event descriptions. The events correspond to the
events relevant to individual Follower experts.

Figure 4.5: Finite-state Machine for the expert Follower-pure.
Follower-pure Figure: 4.5 presents the state machine for the Follower-pure expert in the
S# algorithm, whose target solution is “CC”. The follower-pure expert has a target solution
that it seeks to achieve, but unlike the leader experts it does not punish the partner if the
partner does not comply with the target solution. Thus, follower type experts do not have a
guilt state.
The “Start” state transitions to the initial state “i” with a Null event. As the proposed
target solutions are played, the state transitions occur from “i” to “s1”, “s1” to “s2”, “s2” to
“s3” till “s5”. Further playing the target solution allows the state transition from state “s5”
to itself. In case the proposed target solutions are not followed then transitions occur from
the current state to state “s1”, in which the follower-pure expert tries to reinitialize the CC
pattern. Events where the partner does not comply with the proposed target solution are
represented as “d” in Table 4.2.
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Figure 4.6: Finite-state Machine for the expert Follower-alternating.
Follower-alternating Figure: 4.6 presents the state machine for the Follower-alternating
agent in the S# algorithm. Follower-alternating experts can propose either a target solution
of CD-DC or CC-DC. The state “Start” in Figure 4.6 represents the start state for the expert
and takes a Null input, outputs a speech act, and transitions to the initial state “i”.
All the other states with state names beginning with “s” represent the “offer” or
“satisfied” state in the state machine. The single offer state has been extended to multiple
offer states as “s1”,“s2”,.... “s11” in Figure 4.6 as S# seeks to deliver different speech acts
for different events and states it is in. As the partner of S# accepts the offer made by S#,
the Follower-alternating agent transitions to the respective offer states. “i” is the initial
state for the first part of the target solution, and thus “i” transitions to “s3” when the first
part of target solution is played. Similarly, “s3” transitions to “s4” when the second part
of the target solution is played. Since it is an alternating strategy, playing the first part of
the solution again makes the transition of “s4” to “s7”, and continues likewise. Near to the
end of the state machine diagram, “s10” transitions to “s11” and “s11” to “s10” showing
continued cooperation. Likewise, being in state “s1” and playing the second part of the target
solution, also shows cooperation and the state advances to “s2”. Similarly, following the
target solution, “s2” transitions to “s5”, “s5” to “s6” till “s10”. These indicate the occurrence
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of the event “s” in the table 4.1. This shows a series of continuous cooperation between S#
and its partner.
If the partner plays another action instead of the target solution, the deviation event
“d” in Table 4.2 occurs. This involves transitioning from the initial state “i” and all the satisfied
states beginning with “s” back to state “s2” or “s3”, indicating that the Follower-alternating
agent is seeking to reinitiate the target pattern.

4.3

Priors and Conditional Probabilities

Section 3.2.2 provides only a high-level overview of how the priors and conditional probabilities
necessary for the Bayesian updates were formed. This section presents the details on how
each of the probabilities has been obtained. Most of the tables presented in this section have
been truncated for space. The complete tables are presented in Appendix C.
4.3.1

Priors

The prior probability is the probability of S# being in a particular state before the actions
are taken and proposals made. Three factors determine the prior probability.
Factor One: Valid Starting States. All prior probability is placed on either initial
states, i, or the first satisfied state, s1. Every other possible state has zero prior probability.
Factor Two: Satisficing Experts. Each expert computes its expert potential, which is
the payoff obtained when the target solution is played. If the expert potential exceeds the
initial aspiration level of S#, which is a guess at an achievable payoff calculated by S# before
game play, then that expert is considered satisficing. The initial state i for each satisficing
expert receives a relatively high prior probability. The initial states for each satisficing expert
are all assigned the same prior probability value.
For instance, for the game Prisoners Dilemma, the target solution for the expert
Leader-pure is “CC” which yields a payoff of 60, which is the expert potential for that expert.
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Similarly, for the expert Leader-alternating with the target solution “CD-DC”, the expert
potential is 50. If the initial aspiration level was 55, then the Leader-pure expert would be
satisficing but the Leader-alternating expert with target CD-DC would not be satsificing.
Table 4.3 presents the priors for some of the experts for Prisoners Dilemma. Four
experts were satisficing: the first two rows of the table and the last two rows. Thus, the
initial state i for each of these experts is assigned the same relatively high value of 0.1621.
Expert type

Target solution

Follower-pure

CC

Leader-pure

CC

Follower-alternating

CD-DC

Leader-alternating

CD-DC

Follower-alternating

CC-DC

Leader-alternating

CC-DC

State
i
s1
i
s1
p
i
s1
s2
s3
i
s1
i
s1
i
s1

Prior
0.1621
0.0021
0.1621
0.0021
0.0021
0.0021
0.0021
0.0021
0.0021
0.0021
0.0021
0.1621
0.0021
0.1621
0.0021

Table 4.3: Prior probabilities for different expert types with their respective target solution
for Prisoners Dilemma. The table presents a few of the sample states for some of the experts.

Factor Three: Non-satisficing Experts. The initial state i for each expert that is not
satisficing is assigned the same, relatively low prior probability. The value assigned matches
the value assigned prior probability for states s1. The middle two experts in Table 4.3 are
not satisficing. Thus, the initial states i are assigned a value of 0.0021, which matches the
value for each state s1.
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4.3.2

Conditional Probabilities

The following conditional probability elements describe the necessary components for designing
the model presented in Figure 4.1.

Sensor Model 1 (Speech)
The speech model represents the probability of a proposal shared by S#, zi (t), given S#’s
state, si (t). This probability is represented as p(zi (t)|si (t)) in the complete Bayesian model
presented in Figure 4.1. This conditional probability represents the probability of saying a
particular speech act given the current state of S#.
In the actual gameplay, there are many possible speech acts that can be used for each
possible target solution. Additionally, there are speech acts that represent interpersonal
interactions not related to a specific target solution. Finally, it is possible that no speech acts
are exchanged. Thus the considered speech acts are: the target solutions of experts, other if
the speech acts do not include the target solution, and none if no speech acts are shared.
The FSM for an expert generates speech acts depending on the expert’s internal state
and also on the type of input event in the game. The FSMs for the experts used by S# to
produce speech acts are defined by the state transition tables shown in [14, Supplementary
Table 23]. The Bayesian model uses the conditional probability p( zi (t)|si (t)), which only
includes the internal state; the input event is not modeled at this stage of the Bayesian model.
Leader-pure. Table 4.4 shows the instances for conditional probability for the speech
model for expert “Leader-pure” presented in Figure 4.3 for Prisoners Dilemma.
The Leader-pure expert has a target solution of “CC”. Consequently, speech acts that
promote the target solution generally receive high probability across all internal states of the
Leader-pure expert. The Leader-pure expert also uses silence to promote the target solution,
such as not saying anything if the associate is complying with the request. Thus, it is often
the case that no speech act will be invoked from the Leader-pure internal states. Finally, we
follow the common practice of assigning non-zero probability to every other possible speech
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si (t)
i
s1
s2
s3
s4
s5
p

p(zi (t)|si (t)) for the Leader-pure Expert
zi (t)
None
CC
CD-DC CD-CC CC-DC
0.1017 0.8917
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.8017 0.1917
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.5017 0.4917
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.9017 0.0917
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.9517 0.0417
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.9917 0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.9517 0.0417
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017

Other
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017

Table 4.4: Conditional Probability for Sensor Model 1 (Speech) for the expert Leader-pure
for Prisoners Dilemma. “zi (t)” represents the possible target solutions to be proposed to its
partner. Probability of (zi (t) | si (t)) is equal to Leader-pure state “x”, where “x” can be any
of the Leader-pure states in the table.
act because doing so tends to prevent the Bayesian network from prematurely converging to
an inaccurate probability. Thus, Table 4.4 assigns small but non-zero probability to “other”
speech acts as well as for speech acts that aim for target solutions used by other experts.
Observe that the sum across each row in the table equals one, which demonstrates that the
table satisfies the definition of a conditional probability

P

z

p(z|si (t)) = 1.

The reasoning for the probabilities for various internal states of the Leader-pure agent
is as follows: The initial speech act from state i assigns high probability of proposing the
target solution. If S# is in the first offer state like s1, it means that the players have been
cooperating well, thus, S# would most probably say “None” in this case. For the next offer
state s2, S# would either say “None” or propose the target solution again (“CC” in this
case). The next offer states s3 and s4 indicate that the players have cooperated well enough
for a few rounds, so S# most probably stays quiet and says “None” in these cases. For the
guilt state p, S# wouldn’t say anything at all.
Leader-alternating. Table 4.5 shows the instances for conditional probability for the
speech model for expert “Leader-alternating” presented in Figure 4.4 for Prisoners Dilemma.
The Leader-alternating expert has a target solution of “CC-DC”. Thus, speech acts that
promote the target solution generally receive high probability across all internal states of the
Leader-alternating expert. This expert also uses silence to promote the target solution when
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si (t)
i
s1
s2
s3
s4
s5
s6
s7
s8
s9
s10
s11
p

p(zi (t)|si (t)) for the Leader-alternating Expert
zi (t)
None
CC
CD-DC CD-CC CC-DC Other
0.1017 0.0017
0.8917
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.1017 0.0017
0.8917
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.8017 0.0017
0.1917
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.8017 0.0017
0.1917
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.5017 0.0017
0.4917
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.5017 0.0017
0.4917
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.9017 0.0017
0.0917
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.9017 0.0017
0.0917
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.9517 0.0017
0.0417
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.9517 0.0017
0.0417
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.9917 0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.9917 0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.9517 0.0017
0.0417
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017

Table 4.5: Conditional Probability for Sensor Model 1 (Speech) for the expert Leaderalternating for Prisoners Dilemma. “zi (t)” represents the possible target solutions to be
proposed to its partner. Probability of (zi (t) | si (t)) is equal to Leader-alternating state “x”,
where “x” can be any of the Leader-alternating states in the table.
the associate is complying with the request, and, it is often the case that no speech act will
be invoked from its internal states. Finally, we follow the common practice of assigning a
non-zero probability to every other possible speech act.
The reasoning for the probabilities for various internal states of the Leader-alternating
agent is as follows: Given that S# is in the initial state i1 or the first offer state s1 for
Leader-alternating, there is a high probability of proposing its target solution (which is
“CD-DC” in this case) and there is a minor probability of proposing other proposals. If S#
is in the first offer states s2 or s3, the players have been cooperating well, thus, S# would
most probably say “None” in this case. For the next offer state s4 or s5, S# would either say
“None” or propose the target solution again. The next offer states s6, s7...s11 indicate that
the players have cooperated well enough for a few rounds, so S# most probably stays quiet
and says “None” in these cases. For the guilt state p, S# wouldn’t say anything at all.
Follower-pure and Follower-alternating. Tables 4.6 and 4.7 show the instances
for conditional probability for this model for Prisoners Dilemma for experts “Follower-pure”
and “Follower-alternating” respectively. Their state diagrams are presented in Figure 4.5 and
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Figure 4.6, respectively. Since the target solution for these experts are the same as that of the
corresponding Leader experts, the probabilities for these table are the same as in Table 4.4
and Table 4.5 except that the guilt state p does not exist here.

si (t)
i
s1
s2
s3
s4
s5

p(zi (t)|si (t)) for the Leader-alternating Expert
zi (t)
None
CC
CD-DC CD-CC CC-DC Other
0.1017 0.8917
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.8017 0.1917
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.5017 0.4917
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.9017 0.0917
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.9517 0.0417
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.9917 0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017

Table 4.6: Conditional Probability for Sensor Model 1 (Speech) for the expert Follower-pure
for Prisoners Dilemma. “zi (t)” represents the possible target solutions to be proposed to its
partner. Probability of (zi (t) | si (t)) is equal to Follower-pure state “x”, where “x” can be
any of the Follower-pure states in the table.

si (t)
i
s1
s2
s3
s4
s5
s6
s7
s8
s9
s10
s11

p(zi (t)|si (t)) for the Leader-alternating Expert
zi (t)
None
CC
CD-DC CD-CC CC-DC Other
0.1017 0.0017
0.8917
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.1017 0.0017
0.8917
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.8017 0.0017
0.1917
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.8017 0.0017
0.1917
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.5017 0.0017
0.4917
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.5017 0.0017
0.4917
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.9017 0.0017
0.0917
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.9017 0.0017
0.0917
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.9517 0.0017
0.0417
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.9517 0.0017
0.0417
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.9917 0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.9917 0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017
0.0017

Table 4.7: Conditional Probability for Sensor Model 1 (Speech) for the expert Followeralternating for Prisoners Dilemma. “zi (t)” represents the possible target solutions to be
proposed to its partner. Probability of (zi (t) | si (t)) is equal to Follower-alternating state “x”,
where “x” can be any of the Follower-alternating states in the table.

Transition Model 1 (Reflection)
The Bayesian model is based on the S# algorithm, but the Bayesian model is designed to be
able to predict the actions and internal states of other agents as well. Consequently, even
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though the proposals made by the interaction partner do not affect how the Leader-pure or
Leader-alternating experts behave in S#, the Bayesian model includes the probability that
this might happen for other agents. Thus, the reflection model p(ŝi (t) | si (t), z−i (t), zi (t))
from Figure 4.1 is the conditional probability that the agent will act as if it is in the “effectual
state” denoted by ŝ given its state, its speech act, and the speech act of its partner. The
effectual state can be thought of as the state the agent will use to determine its actions after
it has heard its partner’s proposal, which should be influenced both by the agent’s state and
the agent’s speech act.
The general pattern in the reflection model is to place most of the probability to the
same effectual state as the present state, and since there is also the possibility of initiating
some other expert, a minor part of the probability is assigned to the start state of other
possible experts.
Leader-pure. Table 4.8 shows an instance for the expert “Leader-pure” for Prisoners
Dilemma. The table is not complete and thus has a number of states truncated before and
after the presented states. It just represents the basic idea of how the state on the first column
of the table transition to the other states after the observation of the exchanged proposals.
The values in the table indicate that the the Leader-pure expert or partners that behave like
the Leader-pure expert essentially ignore both its own proposals and the proposals of its
partner.
p(ŝi (t)|zi (t), z−i (t), si (t)) for Leader-pure expert
ŝi (t)
si (t)
zi (t)
z−i (t)
i
s1
s2
i
None
None 0.9906 0.0001
0.0001
i
CC
None 0.9906 0.0001
0.0001
i
CD-DC None 0.9906 0.0001
0.0001
s1
CD-CC Other 0.0001 0.9906
0.0001
s1
CD-DC Other 0.0001 0.9906
0.0001
s1
Other Other 0.0001 0.9906
0.0001
Table 4.8: Conditional Probability for Transition Model 1 (Reflection) for the expert Leaderpure for Prisoners Dilemma with target solution “CC”. “i”, “s1” and “s2” are the states of
the expert.
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Leader-alternating. Table 4.9 shows an instance for the expert “Leader-alternating”
with target solution “CD-DC” for Prisoners Dilemma. The presented table is just a part of
the actual table showing a few transitions. The majority of the probability is back to the
same state. However, for the first two rows in the table, there is also some probability to
initialize “Leader-pure” and “Follower-pure” since these experts also rely on ‘CC’.
p(ŝi (t)|zi (t), z−i (t), si (t)) for Leader-alternating expert
ŝi (t)
LP: CC FP: CC LA: CD-DC
si (t) zi (t) z−i (t)
i
i
s2
s3
s2
None
CC
0.135
0.135
0.7206 0.0001
s2
CC
CC
0.135
0.135
0.7206 0.0001
s2
None Other
0.001
0.001
0.9906 0.0001
Table 4.9: Conditional Probability for Transition Model 1 (Reflection) for the expert Leaderalternating with target solution “CD-DC” for Prisoners Dilemma. The term before the colon
symbol represents the type of expert and the term after represents the expert’s target solution.
“i”, “s2” and “s3” are the states of the respective experts.

si (t)
i
i
s1
s1

zi (t)
None
CC
CD
Other

p(ŝi (t)|zi (t), z−i (t), si (t)) for Follower-pure expert
ŝi (t)
FP:CC
FA: CD-DC
LA: CD-DC
z−i (t)
i
s1
i
s1
i
s1
None
0.9906 0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
None
0.9906 0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
CD-DC 0.0001 0.7881 0.050625 0.050625 0.050625 0.050625
CD-DC 0.0001 0.7881 0.050625 0.050625 0.050625 0.050625

Table 4.10: Conditional Probability for Transition Model 1 (Reflection) for the expert
Follower-pure with target solution “CC” for Prisoners Dilemma. The term before the colon
symbol represents the type of expert and the term after represents the expert’s target solution.
“i” and “s1” are the states of the respective experts.
Follower-pure and Follower-alternating. Tables 4.10 and 4.11 show the instances
for the reflection model for Prisoners Dilemma for the experts “Follower-pure” and “Followeralternating”, respectively. Their states diagrams are presented in Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6,
respectively. In contrast to the Leader type experts, F ollower experts are the type of experts
who listen to what their partners are saying and hence try to follow them. Thus, this idea of
listening to its associate’s proposal is reflected in their Sensor model for speech. The majority
44

p(ŝi (t)|zi (t), z−i (t), si (t)) for Follower-alternating expert
ŝi (t)
LP:CC FP: CC
FA: CD-DC
si (t) zi (t) z−i (t)
i
i
s1
s2
s1
None
CC
0.135
0.135
0.7206 0.0001
s1
CC
CC
0.135
0.135
0.7206 0.0001
s1
None Other
0.001
0.001
0.9906 0.0001

Table 4.11: Conditional Probability for Transition Model 1 (Reflection) for the expert
Follower-alternating with target solution “CD-DC” for Prisoners Dilemma. The term before
the colon symbol represents the type of expert and the term after represents the expert’s
target solution. “i”, “s1” and “s2” are the states of the respective experts.
of the probabilities are assigned to transitioning from the current state to the same effectual
state, but some considerable part of probability is also assigned to new experts whose target
solutions align with the solutions proposed by the interaction partner.
Fhe first two entries in Table 4.10 for the Follower-pure expert the partner’s proposal
is “None”, so it is almost certain that the state transitions occur to their same effectual state.
However, when the partner proposes some specific solution, as in the third entry where the
partner proposes “CD-DC”, a considerable amount of probability is distributed across the
initial state of the experts whose target solution is “CD-DC”. We can see a similar pattern in
Table 4.11 for the expert Follower-alternating as well. When its partner proposes a solution,
a considerable amount of probability is assigned to the initial states of the experts with the
same target solution.

Sensor Model 2 (Action) This action model represents the probability of taking a
particular action given the current state of S# and is denoted by p(ai (t) | ŝi (t)) in Figure 4.1.
In the action model, the majority of the probability is assigned to playing the action
corresponding to the target solution of the expert if S# is in the offer state. For a leader
agent, the majority of the probability is assigned to the other action if it is in the guilt state.
Leader-pure and Follower-pure. Table 4.12 shows the conditional probability
for the expert “Leader-pure” for Prisoners Dilemma for the action model. In the table,
“Cooperate” and “Defect” are the two possible actions representing “C” and “D” respectively
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in the target solution. The target solution for this expert is “CC”. Thus, given that S# is
in the initial (“i”) or any of the satisfied states (“s”), it is almost certain to play the action
“Cooperate”. State “p” is the guilt state, thus, it indicates to play the other action “Defect”
for S#. Thus, in this case, the majority of probability is assigned to “Defect” in Table 4.12.
p(ai (t)|ŝi (t)) for the Leader-pure Expert
ai (t)
ŝi (t) Cooperate
Defect
i
0.9902
0.0098
s1
0.9902
0.0098
s2
0.9902
0.0098
s3
0.9902
0.0098
s4
0.9902
0.0098
s5
0.9902
0.0098
p
0.0098
0.9902

Table 4.12: Conditional Probability for Sensor Model 2 (Action) for the expert Leader-pure
with target solution “CC” for Prisoners Dilemma. The states belong to that of the expert.
“ai (t)” represents the possible actions for the expert.
The corresponding table for the Follower looks the same for the Follower-pure expert
with target solution “CC” except that the table does not have the punishment state. The
table is not shown in the interest of space.
Leader-alternating and Follower-alternating. Table 4.13 shows the conditional
probability for the sensor model action for the expert “Leader-alternating” for Prisoners
Dilemma. The target solution for this expert is “CD-DC”. Thus, given that S# is in the
initial state(“i”), there is a high probability to play action “Cooperate”. Playing “Cooperate”
from state “i” leads to the satisfied state “s3”, which indicates playing the “Defect” part
of the target solution. Likewise, the probabilities are assigned to the states to play the
Cooperate and Defect part alternatively for this expert. State “p” is the guilt state, thus,
it plays the other action “Defect” for S#. Thus, in this case, the majority of probability is
assigned to “Defect” in the table.
The table is same for the Follower-alternating expert with target solution “CD-DC”
too except that they do not have the punishment state. The table is not shown in the interest
of space.
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p(ai (t)|ŝi (t)) for the Leader-alternating Expert
ai (t)
ŝi (t) Cooperate
Defect
i
0.9902
0.0098
s1
0.0098
0.9902
s2
0.9902
0.0098
s3
0.0098
0.9902
s4
0.9902
0.0098
s5
0.0098
0.9902
s6
0.9902
0.0098
s7
0.0098
0.9902
s8
0.9902
0.0098
s9
0.0098
0.9902
s10
0.9902
0.0098
s11
0.0098
0.9902
p
0.0098
0.9902

Table 4.13: Conditional Probability for Sensor Model 2 (Action) for the expert Leaderalternating with target solution “CD-DC” for Prisoners Dilemma. The states belong to that
of the expert. “ai (t)” represents the possible actions for the expert.
Transition Model 2 (Update) Th update model represents the probability of transitioning to a state given the actions taken and the current state of S#, and is denoted by
p(si (t + 1) | ŝi (t), a−i (t), ai (t)). The main idea behind assigning the probabilities is that the
transitions occur to the favorable offer states if the target solutions are played. The state
transitions to the guilt state (if it exists) if its partner defects or else transitions to the first
satisfied state. There is also the probability of initiating some other expert, so a part of
probability is also assigned to the initial states of other possible experts.
Leader-pure. Table 4.14 shows the conditional probability for Transition Model
2 (Update) for the expert Leader-pure with target solution “CC” for Prisoners Dilemma.
For the values for action columns, “C represents “Cooperate” and “D” represents “Defect”.
Playing the target solution causes the transition to forward satisfied states. Defection or
deviation from the target solution by the partner causes the transition to the guilt state “p”.
If it is in the guilt state “p”, it stays in the same state until it itself starts cooperating. In
other cases, the transition takes place to the first satisfied state “s1”, like an attempt to
reset back to the first satisfied state. The other possible transitions are provided with minor
probability to make non zero transitions.
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ŝi (t)
i

s1

s2

s3

s4

s5

p

p(si (t + 1) | ŝi (t), a−i (t), ai (t)) for the Leader-pure Expert
si (t + 1)
ai (t) a−i (t)
i
s1
s2
s3
s4
s5
C
C
0.0014 0.946 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
C
D
0.0014 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
D
C
0.0014 0.946 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
D
D
0.0014 0.946 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
C
C
0.0142 0.0005 0.8824 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
C
D
0.0142 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
D
C
0.0142 0.8824 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
D
D
0.0142 0.8824 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
C
C
0.0278 0.0005 0.0005 0.8142 0.0005 0.0005
C
D
0.0278 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
D
C
0.0278 0.8142 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
D
D
0.0278 0.8142 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
C
C
0.0096 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.9051 0.0005
C
D
0.0096 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
D
C
0.0096 0.9051 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
D
D
0.0096 0.9051 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
C
C
0.0024 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.9414
C
D
0.0024 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
D
C
0.0024 0.9414 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
D
D
0.0024 0.9414 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
C
C
0.0014 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.946
C
D
0.0014 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
D
C
0.0014 0.946 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
D
D
0.0014 0.946 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
C
C
0.0233 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
C
D
0.0233 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
D
C
0.0233 0.0005 0.4187 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
D
D
0.0233 0.0005 0.4187 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005

p
0.0005
0.946
0.0005
0.0005
0.0005
0.8824
0.0005
0.0005
0.0005
0.8142
0.0005
0.0005
0.0005
0.9051
0.0005
0.0005
0.0005
0.9414
0.0005
0.0005
0.0005
0.946
0.0005
0.0005
0.8369
0.8369
0.4187
0.4187

Table 4.14: Conditional Probability for Transition Model 2 (Update) for the expert Leaderpure with target solution “CC” for Prisoners Dilemma. The value “C represents “Cooperate”
and “D” represents “Defect”. The states belong to that of the expert.
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Leader-alternating. The table 4.15 shows a snippet of the probability table for
Transition Model 2 (Update) for the expert Leader-alternating with target solution “CD-DC”
for Prisoners Dilemma. Like mentioned before, each players playing their part of target
solution makes the state transition to forward satisfied states, and deviating from the target
solution makes the transition to either the first satisfied states or the guilt state based on its
FSM presented in Figure 4.4.

ŝi (t)
i

s1

s2

p

ai (t)
C
C
D
D
C
C
D
D
C
C
D
D
C
C
D
D

p(si (t + 1) | ŝi (t), a−i (t), ai (t)) for the Leader-alternating Expert
si (t + 1)
a−i (t)
i
s1
s2
s3
s4
s5
s6
s10
C
0.0009 0.0009 0.4731 0.4731 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
D
0.0009 0.0009 0.0005 0.9458 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
C
0.0009 0.0009 0.4731 0.4731 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
D
0.0009 0.0009 0.4731 0.4731 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
C
0.0009 0.0009 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
D
0.0009 0.0009 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
C
0.0009 0.0009 0.9458 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
D
0.0009 0.0009 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
C
0.0056 0.0056 0.4397 0.4397 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
D
0.0056 0.0056 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.8789 0.0005 0.0005
C
0.0056 0.0056 0.4397 0.4397 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
D
0.0056 0.0056 0.4397 0.4397 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
C
0.0091 0.0091 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
D
0.0091 0.0091 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
C
0.0091 0.0091 0.0005 0.0005 0.2082 0.2082 0.0005 0.0005
D
0.0091 0.0091 0.0005 0.0005 0.2082 0.2082 0.0005 0.0005

s11
0.0005
0.0005
0.0005
0.0005
0.0005
0.0005
0.0005
0.0005
0.0005
0.0005
0.0005
0.0005
0.0005
0.0005
0.0005
0.0005

p
0.0005
0.0005
0.0005
0.0005
0.9458
0.9458
0.0005
0.9458
0.0005
0.0005
0.0005
0.0005
0.8312
0.8312
0.4159
0.4159

Table 4.15: Conditional Probability for Transition Model 2 (Update) for the expert Leaderalternating with target solution “CD-DC” for Prisoners Dilemma. The value “C represents
“Cooperate” and “D” represents “Defect”. The states belong to that of the expert.
Follower-pure and Follower-alternating. The Action probabilities for Followerpure and Follower-alternating are similar to Leader-pure and Leader alternating, and are
omitted for space.
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Chapter 5
Results and Discussion

5.1

Predicting Intent and Plans

Two approaches were used for predicting the intent and plan of the players for each of the
repeated games: the MAP and aggregation method, which are explained in Chapter 3. Since
the data for this work was utilized from older research [14], it did not have the records of
intention and plan of the players during the actual user study. Consequently, there is no
actual intent and plans of the players for validating the predictions from the Bayesian model.
However, for validating the intent and plan predictions for S#, the interaction history was
run through the S# algorithm to see which of the experts were selected, and hence the
corresponding plan followed by the expert was considered as the true plan followed and the
intent of S# is the intention behind the goal of S# expert itself.

5.1.1

Results and Discussion for Intent Prediction

For all three games used in the experiments, both the MAP and Aggregation methods
predicted “Maximize payoff” as the intent of S# for all interactions. The Bayesian models’
predictions comply with the actual intents of the experts of S#. This is because the experts
of S# were designed in [13] with the intent to maximize payoff, except the Bouncer strategy,
which is never initialized for the games used in the experiments. Thus, the Bayesian model
was 100% accurate for predicting the intents of S# agents.
All of the predictions from the model for human players were also “Maximizing Payoff”.
Unfortunately, we do not have measures to evaluate the intent prediction for humans for
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these games, which is one of the limitations in our work. It would have been interesting
to evaluate the intent of the players from a different perspective, like with respect to their
personalities or motivational orientation as in the work [24], where the goal of cooperative,
competitive, and individualistic agents is to achieve joint gain, relative gain, and own gain,
respectively.

5.1.2

Results and Discussion for Plan Prediction

Figure 5.1 shows the results for plan predictions for S# for all three repeated games. The
predictions for both the plans and actions are based on the states’ probabilities of the experts.
The prediction accuracies for plans are similar to that of the action predictions for S#, except
for the Alternator game. Paired T-test shows that the difference in average performance
between the MAP approach and Aggregation for plan prediction is not big enough to be
statistically significant for all three games. The p-values obtained are p = 0.0997, 0.297560,
0.57347 for Prisoners, Chicken and Alternator respectively.

Figure 5.1: Plan prediction for all games

5.1.3

Results and Discussion for Action Prediction

The average accuracy for predicting actions using the MAP and Aggregation was calculated
for modeling S#. Assuming that humans have similar internal states as that of S#, including
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the ability to form intentions and plans to take actions, the Bayesian model was also used to
model humans.
For predictions with cheaptalk (cheaptalk=“Yes”), the model utilized the speech acts
and previous actions as observations to update the posterior probabilities for each state
transition following the Algorithm 1. Another experiment was done for making predictions
without cheaptalk (cheaptalk= “No”), to see how the performance was impacted if there
were only previous actions in the observations and no speech acts. The speech acts were
replaced by a “None” indicating no proposals shared between the players.

Figure 5.2: Action prediction for S# with cheaptalk

Figure 5.3: Action prediction for S# without cheaptalk
Figures 5.2–5.5 summarize the results for action prediction for all three games. Figures 5.2–5.3 present the action prediction comparison of MAP vs Aggregation approaches for
S# for all three games with cheaptalk allowed vs not allowed, respectively. Figures 5.4–5.5
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Figure 5.4: Action prediction for humans with cheaptalk

Figure 5.5: Action prediction for humans without cheaptalk
show the action prediction comparison of MAP vs Aggregation approach for humans for all
three games with cheaptalk allowed vs not allowed, respectively.
Figures 5.2–5.5 show that the highest average accuracies for action prediction are
achieved by the MAP approach with cheaptalk, except for modeling S# with cheaptalk in the
Alternator game, where Aggregation approach was slightly better. The average accuracies
were higher for predictions for S# than that for humans. The MAP approach obtained an
average of ≈88% for the Prisoners Dilemma, ≈80% for Chicken and ≈75% for Alternator
game for modeling human behavior (with cheaptalk).
With cheaptalk, the performance of the MAP and Aggregation approach look comparable when predictions are made. In this case, the Bayesian model receives proposals as one
of the observations. This allows the model to make better state probabilities updates, leading
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Prisoners Dilemma
Chicken
Alternator

S#
cheaptalk = yes cheaptalk = no
0.338801
0.0328798*
0.394649
0.00109877*
0.0455413*
0.809956

Humans
cheaptalk = yes cheaptalk = no
0.0809071
0.00114072*
0.00172486*
0.0108904*
0.459486
0.0151715*

Table 5.1: p-values for predicting actions MAP vs Aggregation for S# and humans.
to better predictions. Thus, MAP with cheaptalk performed the best out of all possible
approaches for predicting the behavior of both S# and humans.
Paired T-test were done to compare the performance of the MAP and the Aggregation
approaches. The tests show that for predictions without cheaptalk for both S# and humans,
the MAP approach performed significantly better than the Aggregation approach, except
for S# without cheaptalk for Alternator game. Thus, the absence of cheaptalk seems to
affect the performance of the Aggregation approach negatively. The p-values are reported
in Table 5.1. The asterisk represents a significant difference. The test also shows that the
MAP approach is significantly better than the Aggregation appproach for modeling humans
in Chicken and modeling S# in Alternator even when the speech signals were present.
Games
Prisoners Dilemma
Chicken
Alternator

S#
0.00858474*
0.0145504*
0.236482

Human
0.0128642*
0.131602
0.328699

Table 5.2: p-values for Aggregation approach, comparing action predictions with and without
cheaptalk.
Games
Prisoners Dilemma
Chicken
Alternator

S#
Human
0.000410432* 0.694303
0.557248
0.717283
0.894261
0.0918917

Table 5.3: p-values for MAP approach, comparing action predictions with and without
cheaptalk.
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 present the p-values for Aggregation approach and MAP approach
respectively for comparing action predictions with and without cheaptalk. The asterisks (∗)
in the table data indicate that there is a significant difference in the average performance of
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predicting actions via MAP and Aggregation approach with and without cheap talk. From
Table 5.3, paired T-test shows that MAP is not affected significantly with the presence of
cheaptalk, except for modeling S# in Prisoners Dilemma. From Table: 5.2 for the Prisoner’s
Dilemma, the Aggregation approach performs significantly better for modeling both humans
and S# with cheaptalk.
The MAP approach was compared against the Aggregation approach to explore the
possible algorithms for identifying the best possible expert in each interaction. For each
expert, the state probabilities are distributed over a set of its internal states. MAP approach
selects the state with the maximum probability as the most probable state, and the expert
corresponding to that state is the most probable expert. The idea of Aggregation approach
was formed with a theory that rather than selecting the expert corresponding to the highest
probability, the most probable expert is the one with the highest summation probability over
all its internal states. However, with the results from different experimentations and paired
T-tests, it was found that there is no significant difference in the average performance of MAP
and aggregation approach to identify the most probable state and the expert when cheaptalk
is allowed. Also, from the paired T-test we can conclude that the Aggregation approach is
impacted negatively for making predictions for normal repeated games, i.e. repeated games
without cheaptalk.

5.1.4

Modeling players who lie

For Chicken 14 out of 34 predictions for humans had the action prediction accuracy less
than 80%. Exploring the data, we found that 10 of those 14 interactions that generated
inaccurate predictions were with lies (≈44% of the time the human shared a deceptive
proposal on average), and 4 of 14 were either without lies or with no proposals at all. If we
omit deceptive interactions, MAP’s accuracy increased to 87.60%. The results are presented
in Figure 5.6. In the figure, we can see that when cheaptalk was not used, i.e. when the
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Figure 5.6: Modeling lies in Chicken
lies were cutoff, there was a little improvement for predictions for liars with the aggregation
approach. However, the improvement is not significant.

For Alternator There were 12 interactions where players lied more than 40% of the times,
and 57% on average. If we omit such interactions, MAP was 78.19% accurate for modeling
humans who lie less frequently (13% of the time on average). However, there is no significant
increase in accuracy in action predictions if the speech acts are removed for the interactions
with lies. The results are presented in Figure 5.7. In most of the cases cheaptalk is seen to
increase accuracy, but not significantly.

Figure 5.7: Modeling lies in Alternator
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Figure 5.8: Comparing our model vs Fixed strategies for Prisoners Dilemma.
5.2

Comparing Action Predictions to Fixed Strategy Models

The action predictions from the Bayesian model were compared against the predictions from
the fixed models presented in [20]. Since the fixed strategies were relevant only for games
with two possible actions, the comparison was done only for the games Prisoners Dilemma
and Chicken.
Figures 5.8 and 5.9 show how the Bayesian model performed as compared to the fixed
strategies for the two games. The performance of the MAP and Aggregation approaches were
better than the fixed strategy models. Unlike the fixed strategies, the Bayes Filter utilizes
cheap talk and previous actions as observations to find the posterior state probabilities which
determine the actions to be taken. Consequently, the Bayesian model did the best out of
other strategies.
The results also show that simple models such as the different variations of tit for tat
performed nearly as well as the Bayesian model for action predictions. The traditional Tit
for Tat model and Exploitive Tit for Tat performed close to the Aggregation approach with
cheaptalk, and performed even better than the Aggregation approach without cheaptalk.
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Figure 5.9: Comparing the Bayesian model vs Fixed strategies for Chicken.
5.3

Comparing Action Predictions to Machine Learning Models

The Weka tool was used to perform experiments to see how different machine learning models
perform on predicting players’ actions for the three repeated games: Prisoners Dilemma,
Chicken and Alternator. Different models from Weka were tested for action predictions but
the following models were the most appropriate and delivered the best results: J48, Random
Forest, and Multilayer Perceptron. The models were trained and tested using the 10-fold
cross validation approach.
The results for the comparison of action predictions by machine learning models
against the Bayesian model are presented in Figures 5.10–F5.12. Four different experiments
using the Bayesian model are compared against the three machine learning models, and
results presented in the graphs. The details on the dataset for the machine learning model
experiments are described in Section B.1.3.
Initially, the models are trained and tested on the whole of the dataset including
data for both S# and humans, which is represented by “both-train” and “both-test” in the
graphs. The other experiment is to train and test the models on the data for humans only,
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Figure 5.10: Action prediction results for Prisoners Dilemma. In the legend, the term before
the hyphen represent whether the dataset involve either the S# or human interactions.
named as “human-train” and “human-test” in the graphs. Similarly, the models are trained
and tested for predictions for S# only, named as “S#-train” and “S#-test”. Finally, the
last experiment consists of training the models on S# data and testing on the data from ,
named as “S#train-humantest”. The rest of the labels in the graph represent the MAP and
Aggregation approaches on human and S# data.
Figure 5.10 shows the results for the game Prisoners Dilemma. The Bayesian model
performed the best out of all other machine learning (ML) models. Multilayer Perceptron
was the best out of the three ML models. The ML models made better predictions for
humans than for S#, whereas results for both S# and humans from the Bayesian model were
comparable. Except for the Multilayer Perceptron model, the results for S#train-human test
show that even when the models were trained on S# and tested on humans, the accuracy
was higher for predicting human actions. Thus for the Prisoners Dilemma, the ML models
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Figure 5.11: Action prediction results for Chicken. In the legend, the term before the hyphen
represent whether the dataset involve either the S# or human interactions.
were able to model the human behavior better than that for S#, whereas the Bayesian model
performed nearly the same for both.
Figure 5.11 shows the results for the game Chicken. The Bayesian model performed
the best out of all other machine learning (ML) models. In most of the cases, J48 performed
the best among other ML models. All the results are seen to be way better for modeling S#
than humans.
Figure 5.12 shows the results for the game Alternator. The Bayesian Model performed
the best out of all other machine learning (ML) models. J48 was the second highest performing
model. Similar to the Chicken game, the results were way better for modeling S# than
humans.
Human behaviors are dynamic and unpredictable, which make their behaviors difficult
to model. Whereas, algorithms have a certain way which govern their actions. This could
be one of the reasons why the Bayesian model as well as the other ML models were able to
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Figure 5.12: Action prediction results for Alternator. In the legend, the term before the
hyphen represent whether the dataset involve either the S# or human interactions.
make better predictions for S# than for humans. It is also evident that for modeling human
behavior, the predictions from the best performing machine learning model, were very close
to that of the Bayesian model.
The “both-test” training and testing condition performed better than making predictions for humans alone, and the “s#train-human test” experiment also decreased the
performance by a big amount.
The Bayesian model involved modeling S# first and using the same model for human
predictions. So, we wanted to explore how would the machine learning models perform
on being trained on the S# dataset, and then tested on the human dataset. This led to
performing the “S#train-human test” experiment, which showed huge variations in prediction
accuracies, lowering them significantly for all three games. Although the performance was the
worst for this experiment out of all others, it gives an insight about modeling human behavior
in RGs. Lower test accuracies show that the pattern in which humans behave is different
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from that of S#, and humans may not be perfectly modeled using S#. Initially modeling S#
with the Bayes Model and then modeling human behavior achieved better accuracies for all
three games.
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Chapter 6
Summary and Future Work

6.1

Summary

In the thesis, a Bayesian graphical model was developed to model agents in two-player
Repeated Games (RGs). The model was used to model the S# algorithm because this
algorithm was shown to perform well across many games and with many interaction partners
including humans.
The S# algorithm uses internal experts that have internal states, make plans, and
seek to satisfy an implicit intention. The Bayesian model was constructed for S# agent and
then applied to predict the actions, plans, and intentions of S# agents. An exploratory study
was conducted that also used the Bayesian model to predict the actions of humans.
The S# algorithm initializes a number of experts and selects the best expert for
the scenario to govern actions to promote cooperation among the players. Thus, the states
for the Bayesian model are the states of the experts in the S# algorithm itself. Likewise,
the intention of the agents are the goals that the experts wish to achieve, and the plans of
the agents are encoded as a sequence of actions, proposals, and internal state transitions
for the finite state machines that implement experts in S#. Observations include previous
proposals and actions shared between the players; these observations were used to update
the probability distribution of the states in the Bayesian model. The Bayes Filter algorithm
was modified to fit in the form of the Bayesian model to update the state probabilities at
each time step given the observations. Two approaches, namely, Maximum A Posteriori
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and Aggregation, were explored to use the state probabilities to make predictions for the
intentions, plans and actions for the agents being modeled.
The framework was tested on three different and widely studied two-players RGs
(Prisoners Dilemma, Chicken and Alternator). The first two games have two actions for each
player whereas, the latter has three possible actions for each player. Additionally, the S#
algorithm can include speech acts (so-called “cheaptalk”) intended to facilitate coordination
with its associates.
Paired T-tests showed that MAP is not affected significantly with the presence of
cheaptalk. However, for the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Aggregation approach performed
significantly better for modeling humans with cheaptalk than without. Paired T-tests also
showed that MAP performs significantly better than Aggregation approach for modeling
humans in all games when cheaptalk was not allowed.
The action predictions from the Bayesion model were compared to fixed strategy
models in the literature presented in [20] and against three different machine learning models:
J48, Random Forest and Multilayer Perceptron. The Bayesian model showed the best
performance in all cases. However, for modeling human behavior, the predictions from the
best performing machine learning model, were very close to that of the Bayesian model.
The thesis provided evidence in support of the following claims: 1) The Bayesian
model effectively models the actions, plans, and intentions in the S# algorithm. 2) The
Bayesian model provides a satisfactory model for predicting the actions of humans in different
two-player repeated games. 3) The MAP approach provides significantly better prediction
accuracy than the Aggregation approach in modeling human behavior when cheaptalk is
not allowed. 4) There is no significant difference in the performance of MAP approach and
Aggregation approach for modeling human behavior when cheaptalk is allowed, except in
Chicken.
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6.2

Future Work

The Bayesian model performed well enough to predict human actions in RGs. However, the
model had some limitations. There were interactions where human players were not truthful
and took actions different from what they proposed. Since the Bayesian model was based on
S# and since S# experts do not include deceptive speech acts, the Bayesian model is not
fit to detect deception or to make accurate predictions when humans deceive. Thus, future
enhancements could include making adjustments in the model to detect and handle lies in the
interactions. A possible approach could be to create S# experts capable of using deceptive
speech acts in a game.
This work has been tested for three kinds of Repeated games. In the future, the model
could also be tested for other kinds of RGs like battle of the sexes, stag hunt, etc. to see how
well it could model the players for those games.
As we did not have enough data to validate the results for humans, only the results
for intent and plan prediction for S# have been presented. Thus in the future, a research
study could be conducted to validate intention and plan predictions for humans too. Also,
there is a narrow exploration of intentionality of the players based on just the intentions of
the S# experts. However, the intent of players could be explored in a lot different ways in
the future. One of the possible ways is exploring the goals of agents as in [24] by identifying
their motivational orientation (e.g., cooperative, individualistic, or competitive) based on
their choice behavior in games. It would also be interesting to understand and see how the
intentions, plans, and goals of players change over time, and make predictions for the future,
which could contribute to explainable AI.

65

Appendix A
Experts in S#

Payoff Matrices for different Repeated Games

A
B

X
60,60
100,0

Y
0,100
20,20

Table A.1: Payoff Matrix for Prisoners Dilemma.

A
B

X
Y
0,0
100,33
33,100 84,84

Table A.2: Payoff Matrix for Chicken.
X
Y
Z
A
0,0
35,70 100,40
B 70,35 10,10 45,30
C 40,100 30,45 40,40
Table A.3: Payoff Matrix for Alternator.

Leader Experts in S# for different Repeated Games
1. Prisoners Dilemma. The following S# experts are classified as Leaders in the Prisoners
Dilemma, followed by the corresponding target solution.
(a) Bouncer
(b) Leader-pure AX
(c) Leader-alternating AY-BX
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(d) Leader-alternating AY-AX
(e) Leader-alternating AX-BX
2. Chicken. The following S# experts are classified as Leaders in Chicken, followed by
the corresponding target solution.
(a) Bouncer
(b) Leader-pure BY
(c) Leader-pure AY
(d) Leader-pure BX
(e) Leader-alternating AY-BY
(f) Leader-alternating BX-BY
3. Alternator. The following S# experts are classified as Leaders in the Alternator game,
followed by the corresponding target solution.
(a) Bouncer
(b) Leader-pure CX
(c) Leader-alternating CX-AZ
(d) Leader-pure AZ

Follower Experts in S# for different Repeated Games
1. Prisoners Dilemma. The following S# experts are classified as F ollowers in the
Prisoners Dilemma, followed by the corresponding target solution.
(a) Maximin
(b) Best Response
(c) Follower-pure AX
(d) Follower-alternating AY-BX
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(e) Follower-alternating AY-AX
(f) Follower-alternating AX-BX
2. Chicken. The following S# experts are classified as F ollowers in Chicken, followed by
the corresponding target solution.
(a) Maximin
(b) Best Response
(c) Follower-pure BY
(d) Follower-pure AY
(e) Follower-pure BX
(f) Follower-alternating AY-BY
(g) Follower-alternating BX-BY
3. Alternator. The following S# experts are classified as F ollowers in the Alternator
game, followed by the corresponding target solution.
(a) Maximin
(b) Best Response
(c) Follower-pure CX
(d) Follower-alternating CX-AZ
(e) Follower-pure AZ
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Appendix B
Experiments

B.1
B.1.1

Data preparation
Dataset for Bayesian Model

The specifics about the dataset is mentioned in the table B.1. The interaction logs were in a
text format, and contained many additional information, so the files were processed to a csv
format, where each log file consists of the following features:
1. Round number
2. Proposal shared by first player
3. Proposal shared by second player
4. Player action which is not being predicted
Games
Prisoners
Dilemma
Chicken
Alternator

#interactions #rounds
24
51

#instances
1224

23
23

1242
1311

54
47

Table B.1: Details of the Dataset

B.1.2

Dataset for validation through existing strategies

Another dataset was formed by having the strategies shown in Table B.2 play against both
the S# and human players. This dataset is used to compare the predictions of the proposed
graphical Bayesian Model to evaluate its performance.
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Strategy
Always Cooperate
Tit-for-Tat (TFT)
TF2T
TF3T
2-Tits-for-1-Tat
2-Tits-for-2-Tats
T2
Grim
Lenient Grim 2
Lenient Grim 3
Perfect TFT/Win-StayLose-Shift
Perfect Tit-for-Tat with 2 rounds of
punishment
Always Defect
False cooperator
Expl. Tit-for-Tat
Expl. Tit-for-2-Tats
Expl. Tit-for-3-Tats
Expl. Grim2
Expl. Grim3
Alternator
Pavlov

Description
Always play C
Play C unless partner played D last round
C unless D played in both last 2 rounds
C unless D played in both last 3 rounds
Play C unless partner played D in either of the last 2 rounds
(2 rounds of punishment if partner plays D)
Play C unless partner played 2 consecutive Ds in the last 3
rounds (2 rounds of punishment if D played twice in a row)
Play C until either player plays D, then play D twice and
return to C
Play C until either plays D, then play D
Play C until 2 consecutive rounds occur in which either played
D, then play D
Play C until 3 consecutive rounds occur in which either played
D, then play D
Play C if both players chose the same move last round, otherwise play D
Play C if both players played C in the last 2 rounds, both
players played D in the last 2 rounds, or both players played
D 2 rounds ago and C last round. Otherwise play D
Always play D
Play C in the first round, then D forever
Play D in the first round, then play TFT
Play D in the first round, then play TF2T
Play D in the first round, then play TF3T
Play D in the first round, then play Grim2
Play D in the first round, then play Grim3
DCDC ...
Start with C, Always play C if partner does not play D

Table B.2: Existing strategies for Prisoners Dilemma.
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B.1.3

Dataset for validation through Machine Learning Models

Three different ARFF data sets were created for the three repeated games: Prisoners Dilemma,
Chicken and Alternator. With each interaction of the round, considered as a row for the
datasets, the following steps were followed to create the three different datasets:
• All the instances from the available dataset were compiled together to form a single
dataset in ARFF format called game-name-general-dataset.arff (Dgeneral).
• All the instances including predictions only for humans were compiled together to form
a single dataset in ARFF format called game-name-humans-dataset.arff (Dhumans).
• All the instances including predictions only for S# were compiled together to form a
single dataset in ARFF format called game-name-s#-dataset.arff (DS#).
The table B.3 shows the number of instances under each dataset. The features in the dataset
are same as the ones mentioned in above section: B.
Games
Prisoners
Dilemma
Chicken
Alternator

#Dgeneral
2448

#Dhumans
1530

#DS#
612

2484
2162

1836
1645

648
517

Table B.3: Details of the dataset for Machine Learning Models.

Experimental Setup for Machine Learning Classification
Each of the three datasets were split into training sets(60%) and test sets(40%) using the
Random Sample filter available in Weka. The following table B.4 shows the number of
instances under each dataset.
The following experiments were run to obtain the action prediction accuracy on the
test sets.
1. Train on Dgeneral-train set to yield accuracy on the general training dataset.
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Games

Dgeneraltrain
1468

Prisoners
Dilemma
Chicken
1490
Alternator 1297

Dgeneraltest
980

Dhumanstrain
918

Dhumanstest
612

DS#-train

DS#-test

367

245

994
865

1101
987

735
658

388
310

260
207

Table B.4: The number of instances under each dataset for Machine Learning Models
2. Test on Dgeneral-test set to yield accuracy on the general testing dataset.
3. Train on Dhumans-train set to yield accuracy on the training dataset on human players.
4. Test on Dhumans-test set to yield accuracy on the test dataset on human players.
5. Train on DS#-train set to yield accuracy on the training dataset on S# algorithm.
6. Test on DS#-test set to yield accuracy on the test dataset on S# algorithm.
7. Train on DS#-train set to yield accuracy on the training dataset on S# algorithm.
(same as #5)
8. Test on Dhumans-test set to yield accuracy on the test dataset on human players.
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Appendix C
Priors and Conditional Probabilities

The complete tables for the priors and conditional probabilities are available under this
link: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1ZLyu8M8aEIxKP5h8 23HQ1z7agmpmBh1?usp=sharing
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